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Abstract
I present a sticky-wage model of exchange rate pass-through with heterogeneous producers
and endogenous markups. The model shows that low levels of exchange rate pass-through to
rm- and aggregate-level import prices coexist with large movements in trade ows. After an
exchange rate shock, aggregate import prices are subject to a composition bias due to changes
in the extensive margin of trade (the number of goods traded between countries). At the rm
level, each producer adjusts its markups depending on its own productivity and the change
in the competitive environment generated by the exchange rate movement. Firm-level price
responses are asymmetric|dierent for appreciations and depreciations|and adjustments
in the intensive margin of trade (rm-level exports) are substantial. In general equilibrium,
the model shows that rm reallocations increase the persistence of exogenous shocks.
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Exchange rates and prices are disconnected in developed economies. Studies for industrialized
countries consistently show a low and slow pass-through of nominal exchange rate changes to con-
sumer import prices (Engel, 2002).1 This empirical regularity is usually interpreted as implying
that the eect of nominal exchange rates on quantities traded between countries, the so-called
expenditure-switching eect of exchange rates, is negligible: if exchange rate movements do not
aect prices, then there are no changes in demand and the quantity traded between countries
does not change. This interpretation is the main support for an assumption of zero pass-through
and no expenditure-switching that is frequently used in open economy macroeconomics (e.g.,
Devereux and Engel, 2003), with strong implications on welfare analysis and the optimal mon-
etary policy. This interpretation, however, ignores the fact that rms are the relevant decision-
makers regarding adjustment after an exchange rate movement.2 In this paper, rms' decisions
about pricing and entry and exit take a primary role in the analysis of pass-through and the
expenditure-switching eect of exchange rates. In contrast to the long-held view, my theoretical
results show that exchange rate movements have substantial expenditure-switching eects, even
in the presence of low levels of exchange rate pass-through to rm- and aggregate-level import
prices.
The model in this paper is inspired by the work of Dornbusch (1987). In a partial equilib-
rium setting with xed wages, Dornbusch investigates how the competitive environment aects
the way rms adjust prices after an exogenous exchange rate movement; the competitive envi-
ronment is captured by the number of domestic and foreign competitors and by the degree of
product substitutability. In a series of models he shows that the response of prices to exchange
rate shocks depends on how rms' markups adjust.3 Dornbusch also notes that exchange rate
movements aect rms' entry and exit dynamics and suggests looking at \how pricing decisions
are aected by entry and relocation possibilities at an international level." Following this sug-
gestion, I develop a model of exchange rate pass-through with endogenous markups that allows
for endogenous entry and reallocation of rms.
In my two-country model, exchange rate movements generate international rm reallocations
because rms are heterogeneous with respect to their levels of productivity. As in Melitz (2003),
a single-product rm knows its relative productivity only after entry; the tradability of its good|
in both the domestic and export markets|is endogenously determined. The least productive
rms sell in no market, some of them sell only in the domestic market, and the most productive
1The rate of exchange rate pass-through to a price is dened as the elasticity of the price with respect to the
exchange rate. A rate of 1 means a full (or complete) exchange rate pass-through.
2In particular, Obstfeld and Rogo (2000) and Obstfeld (2002) argue in favor of high pass-through rates to
border import prices and important expenditure-switching eects, but mention that this is hardly reected in
consumer prices due to factors like distribution services, advertising, other nontradable costs, and the pricing
policies of importing rms. In this respect, Campa and Goldberg (2005) nd average pass-through rates to
import prices|before distribution costs|of 46 percent and 64 percent in the short and long run, respectively, for
OECD countries. For the U.S., the estimates are 25 percent and 40 percent.
3In a related paper, Krugman (1987) coined the term \pricing to market" to refer to a situation of incomplete
exchange rate pass-through as a result of rms setting dierent prices in dierent destination markets, depending
on each market's conditions. As mentioned by Atkeson and Burstein (2008), pricing to market exists in the
presence of trade costs (or some form of market segmentation) and imperfect competition with variable markups.
1rms sell in both the domestic and export markets. Based on zero-markup and free-entry
conditions, my model solves for cuto productivity levels for selling in the domestic and export
markets. Exchange rate movements aect the extensive margin of trade|the number of goods
traded between countries|by altering the cuto productivity levels.4
But how are the extensive margin of trade and exchange rate pass-through related? It
turns out that changes in the extensive margin of trade can generate a disconnect between
exchange rates and aggregate import prices. Consider a version of Melitz's (2003) model with
two countries (A and B), xed costs of exporting, and consumers with constant elasticity of
substitution (CES) preferences over dierentiated goods. Firms are heterogeneous with respect
to their productivity so that more productive rms have lower marginal costs and set lower
prices. With CES preferences, markups are exogenous, which implies full exchange rate pass-
through to rm-level import prices. Let the aggregate import price in country A be given by the
average price of all imports from country B. If the currency of country A depreciates, country
B's exporters become instantly less competitive in country A. With heterogeneous rms, the
least productive (higher price) exporting rms from country B will exit country A. If attrition is
suciently high, the new aggregate import price in country A, computed using only the surviving
rms from B, could even decline (a negative pass-through rate for the aggregate import price!).
Therefore, in this model with full pass-through at the rm level, aggregate import prices are
subject to a survivorship bias|a sample selection problem.5 Moreover, aggregate import prices
do not reect the true expenditure-switching eect of exchange rates, which is large due to the
decrease in the number of exporters from B (the extensive margin) and the decrease in exports
of the survivors (the intensive margin).
As mentioned before, with endogenous markups there is also a disconnect between exchange
rates and rm-level import prices. The demand system with endogenous markups that serves
as the core of my monopolistic competition model is derived from a continuum-of-goods version
of the translog expenditure function introduced by Bergin and Feenstra (2000). In this demand
system, markups increase with rm productivity. After an exchange rate movement, pass-
through to rm-level prices is incomplete as a result of two reinforcing eects in each rm's
markup: a rm-specic eect, related to the rm's own productivity level; and an economy-
4In this model the variations in the extensive margin of trade correspond exactly to variations in the number of
sellers because each rm produces a single good. Recent research by Bernard, Redding, and Schott (forthcoming)
considers the case of multi-product rms and divides the variations in the extensive margin of trade into two
components: the variation due to entry and exit of rms, and the variation due to existing rms adding or
dropping products.
5In principle, an international price index is based on a xed basket of goods, and as long as this basket
remains the same, it should not be aected by changes in the extensive margin of trade. In practice, however,
baskets of goods used to compute indexes tend to change frequently as new goods enter the market and some
other goods disappear. In the U.S., the International Price Program (IPP) of the Bureau of Labor Statistics
frequently changes the bundles used to compute the international price indexes. According to the IPP's website,
25% of the universe used to compute international prices is resampled every six months. In an extreme case, it
would be possible to have two entirely dierent samples every two years. Moreover, the IPP explicitly addresses
the importance of changes in the extensive margin of trade for international prices. The IPP website states: \In
the realm of international trade, the appearance of new goods and the disappearance of other goods presents a
serious problem that requires the International Price Program to resample its universe frequently. The volatility
in traded goods arises from changes in domestic prices, as well as changes in the prices of foreign goods and
changes in exchange rates." (See http://www.bls.gov/mxp/ippadd1.htm) It is interesting to note that the IPP
identies exchange rate changes as one of the sources for the changes in the extensive margin of trade.
2wide eect, which mirrors the change in the competitive environment generated by the exchange
rate movement. Furthermore, the direction of the exchange rate movement matters for both the
rm-specic and the economy-wide eect. In particular, exchange rate pass-through to rm-level
import prices is higher for appreciations than for depreciations of the importer's currency.
I present two versions of the model. First, I introduce a partial equilibrium version that
allows us to identify the main mechanisms of transmission of an exchange rate shock. As in
Dornbusch (1987), I assume that exchange rate movements are exogenous and that wages are
xed. Entry and exit of rms are allowed. The partial equilibrium model is analytically tractable,
and a closed-form solution exists. Second, I introduce a general equilibrium version of the model
following the new open economy macroeconomics tradition. As in Obstfeld and Rogo (2000),
the model is stochastic, and nominal wages are sticky (set a period in advance). This nominal
rigidity is the model's only source of monetary non-neutrality. In this version of the model,
the exchange rate responds endogenously to a monetary shock. Moreover, current-account
imbalances are possible due to international trade in riskless bonds. To preserve the second-
order eects, the general equilibrium model is solved using a second-order accurate solution
method.
A strong prediction of my model|in both versions|is that the exchange rate pass-through
to the aggregate import price is negative at the time of the exchange rate movement (e.g.,
a depreciation of the importer's currency reduces the aggregate import price). This result is
the consequence of a composition eect|similar to the survivorship bias example above|due to
changes in the extensive margin of trade, and it holds even if the average rm-level pass-through
rate is positive. This result is not exclusive to the translog case, and in particular, it holds for
the CES case. The empirical regularity is, however, a low but positive rate of pass-through
to aggregate import prices. This empirical fact can be reconciled with the previous theoretical
prediction if we consider that the original model does not distinguish between unit and quality-
adjusted prices. Therefore, I develop a brief extension of the model that incorporates this
distinction. The quality model predicts a negative pass-through rate to the aggregate quality-
adjusted import price but the pass-through to the aggregate unit import price can be positive.
On the other hand, pass-through rates to rm-level prices are not aected by this extension|
that is, the rate of pass-through is identical for a rm's quality- and non-quality-adjusted price.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews the theoretical and empirical background
on endogenous markups and pass-through, the importance of the extensive margin of trade, and
the evidence on sticky wages and rm entry/exit. Section 3 presents the partial equilibrium
model and section 4 shows its implications for the impact of exchange rate movements on (rm-
and aggregate-level) prices and trade ows. Section 5 introduces the general equilibrium version
of the model and explores its implications for pass-through and trade ows after a permanent
monetary shock. Section 6 presents the extension of the model that considers quality. Finally,
section 7 concludes.
32 Theoretical and Empirical Background
In addition to the seminal theoretical contributions on endogenous markups and pass-through
of Dornbusch (1987) and Krugman (1987), the response of markups to exchange rate changes
has strong empirical support. Goldberg and Knetter (1997) survey the evolution of empirical
studies on exchange rates and prices up to the mid-1990s and show evidence in favor of pricing-to-
market models. They conclude that destination-specic changes in markups are a very signicant
factor in the lack of response of prices to exchange rate changes. Recent industry-specic pass-
through studies nd similar results. For example, Hellerstein (2008), using scanner data from a
retailer in the Chicago area, nds that markup adjustment accounts for about half of the lack
of response of imported beer prices to exchange rate changes. Along the same lines, Nakamura
and Zerom (forthcoming) nd that markup adjustment in the coee industry reduces the rate
of pass-through in about 33% when compared against a CES benchmark.
The recent theoretical literature on heterogeneous rms has also paid substantial attention to
endogenous markups. This is the case because the empirical observations that motivated the ag-
ship heterogeneous-rm models of Bernard, Eaton, Jensen, and Kortum (2003) and Melitz (2003)
also highlighted the eects of trade liberalization on the degree of competition. Tybout (2003),
for example, surveys empirical studies documenting both the productivity dierences between
exporters and non-exporters and the decline of rms' markups due to the increase in import
competition after trade liberalization. With this background, heterogeneous-rm models have
introduced variable markups in dierent ways. For example, Bernard, Eaton, Jensen, and Kor-
tum (2003) assume Bertrand (price) competition, Atkeson and Burstein (2008) assume Cournot
(quantity) competition, while Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) assume a quasilinear-quadratic util-
ity function that generates a linear demand system with endogenous markups. In this respect,
my model is closer to the model of Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), with the main dierence being
the use of translog preferences to generate endogenous markups.
A key contribution of the trade models with heterogeneous rms is to identify the extensive
margin of trade as a fundamental channel for international adjustment. Traditional monopolistic
competition trade models, in the spirit of Krugman (1980), assume homogeneous rms that pro-
duce dierentiated goods. In these models, changes in the extensive margin of trade only occur
when an economy moves from autarky (no trade) to trade openness. Once the economy trades
with another country, the number of traded goods remains constant and further adjustments
in the volume of trade (due, for example, to a decrease in trade costs) only occur through the
intensive margin. Ignoring the extensive margin can be theoretically and empirically mislead-
ing. Theoretically, for example, Chaney (2008) shows that the intensive and extensive margins
of trade can work in opposite directions. He demonstrates that an important result of Krugman
(1980) about the role of the elasticity of substitution for the impact of trade costs on trade
volumes is overturned when one considers the extensive margin of trade. Empirically, Helpman,
Melitz, and Rubinstein (2008) show that traditional gravity equation models for trade ows are
biased because they omit the extensive margin of trade; the omission also seems to explain the
observed asymmetries in trade ows between countries.
For the U.S., Bernard, Jensen, Redding, and Schott (2009) provide specic measures of the
4importance of the extensive margin for trade ows. They document that the extensive margin
accounts for most of the variation in exports and imports across U.S. trading partners. In
2003, for example, they nd that the extensive margin accounts for 77.4% of the cross-sectional
variation in U.S. exports, and 68.2% of the variation in imports. Moreover, through their
analysis of the 1997-1998 Asian nancial crisis, Bernard et al. provide direct evidence of how
a macroeconomic shock involving substantial exchange rate movements aects the margins of
U.S. trade. For a group of crisis countries (Indonesia, South Korea, Malaysia, the Phillipines,
and Thailand), they nd that from 1996 to 1998, U.S. exports declined by 21% and imports
increased by 19%. During the same period, the number of U.S. exporters to this group of
countries declined 16% and the intensive margin of surviving exporters declined 2%.6 Taking
into account that the crisis started in July 1997, this result implies that a shock can cause fast
and substantial changes in the number of exporting rms.
In a similar study for France, Eaton, Kortum, and Kramarz (2004) nd that changes in
French exports are strongly dominated by the extensive margin. Using data from French rms
in 1986, they nd that a) for a given destination size, the extensive margin accounts for 88% of
any increase in the French market share in that destination; and b) keeping the French market
share constant, the extensive margin accounts for about 62% of any increase in exports due to
an increase in a destination's market size. Regarding the speed of adjustment of the extensive
margin in France, Berman, Martin, and Mayer (2009) examine the changes in the number of
French exporters after a euro depreciation. Using French rm-level data, they nd that entry
of new exporters occurs within a year after the depreciation and that this accounts for 20% of
the increase in French exports.
Although the number of exporters can change quickly, this does not imply that entry of
new rms occurs at the same pace.7 However, an important assumption of my model is that
it allows for entry and exit of rms in the presence of nominal wage rigidities. It is therefore
important to establish the appropriate time frame for the the validity of the model's results. For
this purpose, it is useful to review the evidence on wage stickiness, employment uctuations,
and rm creation and destruction.
First, strong evidence of nominal wage rigidities appears for many countries.8 Using annual
microdata for the U.S., Kahn (1997) presents some stylized facts on wage stickiness and nds in
particular a high degree of downward wage rigidity. Importantly for this paper, Kahn shows that
nominal wages exhibited substantial downward rigidity even in the 1980s, which was a period of
increasing import competition and decreasing ination. Regarding the macroeconomic eects
of wage rigidities, Obstfeld and Rogo (1996) refer to the long-held view in macroeconomics|
dating back to Keynes's General Theory|that nominal wage stickiness is the central source of
monetary non-neutrality in the economy. In this respect, Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans
(2005) nd that nominal wage rigidities|but not nominal price rigidities|are essential to match
6Compared to U.S. trade with the rest of the world, Bernard et al. (2009) report that from 1996 to 1998 U.S.
exports and imports increased by 3% and 17%, respectively. Also, the number of U.S. exporters to the rest of the
world declined 8%, and the incumbents intensive margin increased 8%.
7For example, an increase in the number of exporters could be composed mostly of existing rms that were
producing only for the domestic market.
8See Akerlof (2007) and the references cited therein.
5the U.S. economy responses of ination and output persistence to a monetary shock. Moreover,
extending the framework of Christiano et al. by introducing a labor search and matching
structure, Gertler, Sala, and Trigari (2008) also nd that nominal wage rigidities are necessary
to match the high U.S. employment volatility over the business cycle.9
Employment movements, particularly gross ows, are indeed large. According to the survey
by Davis, Faberman, and Haltiwanger (2006), annual job creation and destruction rates in the
U.S. are about 14% of total employment (the quarterly rates are about 8%). Total levels of job
creation consist of expansions of existing rms and births of rms. Likewise, total levels of job
destruction are composed by contractions of existing rms and deaths of rms. In support of my
model's entry and exit assumption in the presence of nominal rigidities, evidence suggests that
births and deaths of rms are a very important component of gross employment ows even in
one-year horizons. Davis and Haltiwanger (1992) estimate that births of rms in the U.S. account
for 20% of annual job creation, and deaths account for 25% of annual job destruction. These
numbers are, however, small when compared against new estimates by Neumark, Zhang, and
Wall (2006). Using data from the National Establishments Time Series (NETS) for California
from 1992 to 2002, they nd that for three-year employment changes, establishment births
account on average for 62.4% of job creation, and deaths account for 71.4% of job destruction.
For year-to-year changes the numbers are about 60% for births and 66% for deaths.10 An
establishment can be a branch of an existing rm or a rm. Taking this into account, Neumark,
Zhang, and Wall (2006) report that for three-year changes, the birth of rms accounts on average
for 41% of job creation, and the death of rms accounts for 44% of job destruction|with similar
year-to-year contributions. They also nd that net employment changes are more correlated with
employment movements due to the births and deaths of establishments than to expansions and
contractions, suggesting that cyclical changes in employment are mostly driven by births and
deaths.
Strengthening these results, Bilbiie, Ghironi, and Melitz (2007a) present evidence on the
strong procyclical behavior of net rm entry in the U.S. (see also the references cited therein).
Bergin and Corsetti (2008) go further and link entry with monetary policy. They nd that
the entry response to a monetary policy shock is statistically signicant and reaches its peak in
about a year. On this basis, Bergin and Corsetti (2008) and Bilbiie, Ghironi, and Melitz (2007b)
study monetary policy in models with endogenous producer entry and nominal rigidities. These
models are, however, not suited for analysis of exchange rate pass-through because they assume
nominal rigidities in the form of sticky producer prices. Closer to this paper, Bergin and Feenstra
(2009) assume short-run xed wages and free entry in a model of exchange rate pass-through
with translog preferences and homogeneous rms. Their purpose is to explain the decrease in
9Recent (real) search and matching models of employment have incorporated (real) wage rigidities in order to
account for the considerable employment volatility observed over the business cycle (see, e.g., Shimer (2005), Hall
(2005), and Gertler and Trigari (2009)).
10Although three-year changes and year-to-year changes are very similar, Neumark, Zhang, and Wall (2006)
focus on three-year changes because they argue that they are less aected by rounding or imputation problems.
Neumark, Zhang, and Wall (2007) and Neumark, Wall, and Zhang (forthcoming) provide careful assessments
of the NETS data. As they mention, NETS attempts to capture the entire universe of establishments and is
particularly good in tracking small establishments. Other establishment-level databases from the Census and the
Bureau of Labor Statistics are samples that do not take into account establishments with less than ve employees.
6aggregate pass-through to U.S. import prices through a mechanism of competition between rms
from a country with a exible exchange rate and rms from country with a xed exchange rate.
In their model, pass-through is incomplete and declines with an increase in the number of rms
from the xed-exchange rate country. Their main result relies, however, on an assumption of a
U.S. taste bias in favor of the goods of the exible exchange rate country. The model in this
paper does not assume any type of taste bias, and the competition occurs between domestic and
foreign rms.11
The general equilibrium version of my model also relates to the model of Ghironi and Melitz
(2005), which is the rst to incorporate heterogeneous producers in a dynamic stochastic general
equilibrium setting. The main dierences between Ghironi and Melitz's model and mine are that
I present a monetary model with nominal wage rigidities (but exible prices) and endogenous
markups, whereas they present a (real) model with exible wages and prices and exogenous
markups (CES preferences).
3 The Model in Partial Equilibrium
This section presents a partial equilibrium model of exchange rates, heterogeneous rms, and
endogenous markups. This model follows closely the model of Melitz and Ottaviano (2008),
who study the implications of dierent market sizes and integration policies on trade using
a framework of heterogeneous rms and endogenous markups. Melitz and Ottaviano obtain
endogenous markups through the use of a quasilinear-quadratic utility function that is very
tractable for a partial equilibrium model, but because the utility function is not homothetic it
is dicult to work with in a general equilibrium setting like the one we consider later.12 Instead
of a quadratic utility, my model derives a demand system with endogenous markups from the
translog expenditure function introduced by Bergin and Feenstra (2000). The translog function
generates endogenous markups, and also implies a utility function that is homothetic.
There are two countries, Home and Foreign, each of which is inhabited by a continuum of
households in the interval [0;1]. Each household provides labor to the production sector in the
economy, which produces dierentiated goods. Firms are heterogeneous in productivity. Each
rm produces a single good under monopolistic competition, and the tradability of the good|in
the domestic and export markets|is endogenously determined. This is a partial equilibrium
model in the Dornbusch (1987) sense: nominal wages are xed, and movements in the exchange
rate are exogenous. Hence, an exchange rate shock alters the relative cost of labor between
the countries, making the rms from the depreciating-currency country more competitive in the
other market (and the opposite happens with the rms from the appreciating-currency country).
11Bergin and Feenstra (2009) note that the main reason for an incomplete pass-through should stem from
competition from domestic rms. Although they do not consider it in their model, they mention that competition
from domestic rms can be incorporated if we see the U.S. as part of the group of countries with xed exchange
rates against the U.S. dollar. Given their taste bias assumption, however, this would imply that U.S. consumers
have a taste bias against U.S. produced goods (and in favor of goods from countries with exible exchange rates).
12Moreover, a quasilinear utility function is not desirable in a general equilibrium framework because it implies
no income eects in the demand for dierentiated goods|any change in income is absorbed by the consumption
of the homogeneous good.
7I begin by describing preferences and obtain the demand, then I present the production sector
and derive some results regarding averages and the composition of rms, and nally I describe
the free-entry conditions and solve the model. I use a star (*) to denote Foreign variables. Some
parts of this section only refer to the Home country, as analogous expressions will hold for the
Foreign country.
3.1 Model Setup
3.1.1 Preferences and Demand
Preferences are obtained from a continuum-of-goods version of the translog expenditure function
introduced by Bergin and Feenstra (2000)|and generalized in Feenstra (2003) for a varying
number of goods. Although it is not possible to obtain a closed-form expression for the utility
function, the demand system is derived directly from the expenditure function.
The representative Home household denes its preferences over a continuum of dierentiated
goods in the set . This set includes the total number of actual, old, and potential (not yet
invented) goods and has a measure of ~ N. Let 0, with measure N, be the subset of  that
contains the set of goods that are actually available for purchase at Home. If E represents
the minimum expenditure to reach utility level U, and pi is the price of good i, then the
symmetric translog expenditure function for the representative Home household|dened over
the continuum of available goods, from Home and Foreign|is given by












lnpi(lnpj   lnpi)djdi; (1)
where a = 1
2N. The value of  is greater than zero and indicates the degree of substitutability
between the goods, with a high  implying high substitutability (or low dierentiation). Note
that a is decreasing in N, which implies that if prices are the same for all goods, the expenditure
needed to reach a certain level of utility declines with N. In other words, the utility function
from the translog expenditure function exhibits love of variety.
Taking the derivative of equation (1) with respect to lnpi|Shephard's lemma|we get the
result that the share of good i in the expenditure of the representative household is given by













is the maximum price (in Home currency) a rm can set, and lnp = 1
N
R
j20 lnpjdj. Note that
si is positive only when pi is below ^ p and is exactly zero when they are equal.
The representative Home household demand for good i is then qi = si
I
pi, where I is the house-
hold's total consumption expenditure (in Home currency). Given that households are located
in the unit interval, the market demand at Home for good i is equivalent to the representative
household's demand.
Analogous expressions hold for the representative Foreign household, with ^ p being the max-
imum price that a rm can set in the Foreign market and I representing the consumption
8expenditure (both in terms of Foreign currency).
3.1.2 Prot Maximizing Price
Assuming a constant marginal cost for the production of Home good i, mci, and taking ^ p as











mci. To solve for pi, Bergin and Feenstra (2000, 2001,







pi  1. It is possible,
however, to obtain a closed-form solution for pi by making use of the Lambert W function.13
Although it is usually denoted by W, I represent it with 
 in order to prevent a confusion with
W, which will be used later for the wage level. 




that if x = zez, we solve for z as z = 
(x). If x is a real number greater than or equal to zero,

(x) is single-valued, with properties 
0(x) > 0, 
00(x) < 0, 
(0) = 0, and 
(e) = 1.14 Then,















equals one when mci = ^ p and is above one if mci < ^ p. Firm i does not produce
for this market if mci > ^ p.
Let i be the markup over the marginal cost for producer i. Therefore, we can rewrite
equation (3) as










Note that the markup is strictly decreasing with the marginal cost for mci  ^ p, reaching zero
when mci = ^ p.
I can also derive a convenient expression for the market-share density of producer i. Taking
the logarithm of equation (3) and using the property ln[
(x)] = lnx   
(x) for x > 0 along
with equation (5), we obtain
lnpi = ln ^ p   i: (6)





, we nd that
si = i: (7)
That is, the market share and the markup of producer i are directly proportional.







(x)] for x 6= 0, and ln[
(x)] = lnx   
(x) when x > 0.
93.1.3 Production
Home and Foreign markets are segmented. Labor is the only factor of production, and wages
are xed in term of each country's currency. Producers are heterogeneous in productivity. As
in Melitz (2003), each producer knows its productivity, ', only after entry. The production
function for a Home rm with productivity ' is given by
y(') = Z'L;
where Z is an aggregate labor productivity factor for Home rms, and L is a labor index whose
nominal price is given by W. The marginal cost of a Home rm with productivity ' is then
constant and given by W
Z'.
There is a sunk entry cost that accounts for the research and investment necessary to start
producing a good. Let fE denote the entry cost in units of eective labor. In nominal terms,
this cost is given by
fEW
Z . After paying the entry cost and realizing its productivity, a rm will
produce for the domestic market as long as it can set a price no less than its marginal cost.
In the same way, the production function of a Foreign rm with productivity ' is just
y(') = Z'L, where Z is the Foreign aggregate productivity factor and L is the Foreign
labor index with price W. This rm must pay a sunk entry cost of f
E units of eective labor,
and its marginal cost is W
Z'.
Given market segmentation and constant marginal costs, a producer will independently
decide whether or not to sell in each country. The only cost of exporting is an iceberg cost. Let
 account for the iceberg cost for Home producers so that a Home exporter must ship  > 1
units of the good in order for one unit to reach the Foreign market. In the same way,  accounts
for the iceberg cost for Foreign producers.
Let pD(') and pX(') denote, respectively, the nominal domestic (D) and export (X) prices
of a Home rm with productivity '. These prices are set in the currency of the destination
country. Also, let E be the nominal exchange rate, measured as the Home-currency price of the
Foreign currency. Following equations (4) and (5), we write the pricing equations for a Home
rm with productivity ' as
pD(') = (1 + D('))
W
Z'






















Solving for the equilibrium quantities (yD(') and yX(')) and prot functions (D(') and


























where the prot functions are in terms of the destination country's currency.
Analogously, a Foreign rm with productivity ' will set prices
p






























and expressions for equilibrium quantities (y
D(') and y
X(')) and prot functions in the Foreign
currency (
D(') and 
X(')) that are parallel to those of a Home rm with productivity '.
3.1.4 Cuto Productivity Levels
A key feature of Melitz-type heterogeneous-rm models is that they summarize the informa-
tion of the production sector in simple cuto productivity levels. In this model we derive the
cuto rules from the markup equations from the previous section.15 Let 'r denote the cuto
productivity level for Home rms in market r, for r 2 fD;Xg. Similarly, '
r represents the
cuto productivity level for Foreign rms in market r. Then, we dene the cuto rules as
'r = inff' : r(') > 0g and '
r = inff' : 
















Obviously, the markup in a market is zero for a rm whose productivity is identical to the
corresponding cuto rule. Therefore, we refer to the previous equations as zero-cuto-markup
conditions.16 From these conditions we obtain two of the four equations we need to solve the










15An important dierence between this model and the Melitz (2003) model, which uses CES preferences, is that
we do not need to assume xed costs in order to pin down the cuto productivity levels. The quasilinear-quadratic
utility function of Melitz and Ottaviano (2008) also generates a demand system that does not need to impose
xed costs.
16The denition of a cuto level is in terms of the inmum|the greatest lower bound|because markups are










where the term in brackets in each equation is the relative cost of eective labor. Intuitively,
there is a proportional relationship between 'D and '
X because Home rms selling domestically
and Foreign exporters are both bounded by ^ p|the maximum price they can set at Home. The
constant of proportionality depends on the iceberg cost of exporting for Foreign rms, , and
on the relative cost of eective labor. The same happens between '
D and 'X.




















for a Home and Foreign rm with productivity ', where '  'r and '  '
r, and r = fD;Xg.
Given that 
0() > 0 and 
00() < 0, we see that markups are increasing in ', but marginal
markups are decreasing.
3.2 Productivity Distribution, Averages, and the Composition of Firms
I assume that the productivity of Home and Foreign rms is Pareto distributed in the interval
['min;1).17 That is, the cumulative distribution function for productivity in each country is





, where k > 1 is a parameter of productivity dispersion|with
a higher k implying lower heterogeneity (with rms' productivities clustered near the lower
bound). The probability density function is then g(') =
k'k
min
'k+1 . Let g(' j '  'r) denote
the probability density function for the productivity of Home rms that are actually selling in
market r, for r 2 fD;Xg. Thus, given our Pareto distribution assumption, we get








'k+1 if '  'r
0 otherwise
(12)
for Home rms|with a parallel conditional distribution holding for Foreign rms. The following
lemma states a result that is useful in the derivation of some results involving averages:
Lemma 1 Let h(';'r) be a homogeneous of degree n function and let g(' j '  'r) be dened
as in (12). Then, the expected value of h(';'r), given that '  'r, is
Z 1
'r
h(';'r)g(' j '  'r)d' =  h'n
r;
17The Pareto distribution|a power-law distribution|ts the distribution of U.S. and European rms very well
(see Chaney (2008) and the references cited therein) and is widely used in models with heterogeneous rms (see,
among others, Ghironi and Melitz (2005) and Melitz and Ottaviano (2008)).







Using this lemma we obtain that the average productivity of Home rms selling in market
r is given by  'r = k




given their proportional relationship, we only need to look at changes in the cuto levels to infer
average productivity changes.
Regarding the average markup, from equations (10) and (11) we observe that r(') and

r(') are homogeneous of degree zero in (';'r) and (';'
r), respectively. From Lemma 1
we obtain that the average markups,  r and  
r, for r 2 fD;Xg, are equal and constant. In
particular, we get
 r =  
r =  (k); (13)
where  (k) is a constant greater than zero depending only on the dispersion parameter k. If
rms are (approximately) homogeneous in productivity (k ! 1), the average markup  (k)
approaches zero.18
With respect to average prices, let  pr and lnpr denote the average price and the average
log-price of Home goods available for purchase in market r, for r 2 fD;Xg. Also, let  p and lnp
represent the average price and the average log-price of all goods|Home produced and Foreign






, we have the following proposition:
Proposition 1 (Equivalence of average prices of domestic and imported goods)
1.  p =  pD =  p
X = #(k) W
Z'D and  p =  p
D =  pX = #(k) W
Z'
D, where #(k) < 1 is a constant.19


















Under a Pareto distribution of rms and in the absence of xed costs, the equivalence of
average prices (and average log-prices) of domestic and imported goods stems from the common
price ceiling faced by all rms competing in the same market. In the Home market, for example,
Home producers and Foreign exporters are limited by ^ p, which creates|as seen in equation
(8)|a link between the cuto rules 'D and '
X. Thus, any shock that increases the domestic
cuto rule for Home rms, 'D, causes an identical decrease in the average prices of domestic
and imported varieties. The perfect relationship between the average prices of domestic and
imported varieties is not exclusive to the translog case. It also holds, for example, if we use
the quasilinear-quadratic utility function of Melitz and Ottaviano (2008).20 Moreover, for the











xk+2 dx is increasing in k, with a value close to 0.6387 when k approaches 1|from the right|and
bounded above by 1.
20A previous version of this paper, available upon request, develops the model with the Melitz-Ottaviano
quasilinear-quadratic utility function. With an exception mentioned in section 4.2, the main results in this paper
hold in the quadratic utility case.
13CES (exogenous markups) case|which requires xed costs to pin down the cuto levels|with a
Pareto distribution of rms,  pD =  p
X if one of the following conditions is met: (1) the xed cost
of Home producers from selling domestically is identical|in terms of the Home currency|to
the xed cost of exporting for Foreign producers; or (2) if the elasticity of substitution between
goods tends to innity. In any other situation, the dierence between  pD and  p
X depends on
the magnitude of the deviations from the previous conditions. I derive this and other results for
the CES case in Appendix B (online).21
Corollary 1 The mass of goods available for purchase in each country|N at Home and N at
Foreign|is constant and equal to 1
 (k).
Although N and N are constant in this model, the composition of domestic and imported
goods in each market is allowed to change. Let ND and NX be the mass of Home rms producing
for the Home and Foreign markets, respectively. With similar expressions for the Foreign rms,
we have that N = ND +N
X and N = N
D +NX. Let NP (N
P) denote the measure of the pool
of existing rms at Home (Foreign). Given our productivity distribution, we have that

















for r 2 fD;Xg. Substituting these expressions in ND + N
X = N and N
D + NX = N, and
making use of N = N = 1
 (k) along with equations (8) and (9), we solve for NP and N
P in
























The values for NP and N
P must be non-negative. Therefore, I assume that trade costs are
suciently high so that ()'D  'X and ()'
D  '
X always hold. Using again equations
(8) and (9), these conditions are respectively equivalent to '
D  '
X and 'D  'X. Hence, I
assume that Home and Foreign exporters always sell in their domestic markets.22
As in Melitz (2003), I assume that there is an exogenous death shock at the end of every
period that forces a proportion  of existing rms in each country to exit. There is also free
entry of rms at the beginning of every period. Therefore, the pool of Home rms in period t+1
is NP;t+1 = (1 )NP;t+NE;t+1, where NE;t+1 is the mass of Home entrants at the beginning of
21Appendix B is available at http://www.socsci.uci.edu/~jantonio.
22These conditions are not too restrictive. For the U.S. and Germany, for example, almost all the exporting
plants sell domestically. Using 1992 data, Bernard, Eaton, Jensen, and Kortum (2003) report that only 4.3% of
U.S. exporting plants export more than 50% of their output (only 0.7% export more than 90% of their output).
Likewise, using also 1992 data, Bernard and Wagner (1997) nd that only 12.6% of German exporting plants
export more than 50% of their output.
14t+1. In the steady state the measure for the pool of rms is constant at NP, so that NE = NP.
Analogous expressions hold for the Foreign country so that in the steady state N
E = N
P.
In summary, with respect to production decisions and entry and exit dynamics, a producer
will sell in a market during period t if and only if its productivity, ', is no less than the
corresponding cuto level at that time. If a producer does not sell in a period, it stays dormant
until it is hit by a death shock and exits, or until one or both of the cuto levels decline to|or
below|this producer's productivity level.
3.3 Free-Entry Conditions
Entry is unbounded. Firms will enter in each country as long as their expected value of entry
is no less than the sunk entry cost. Before entry|when a potential entrant does not know its





and r(') is as dened in section 3.1.3 for r = fD;Xg. Given that   does not depend on time,
and taking into account the exogenous death shock at the end of every period, the expected
value of entry for a Home rm is
1 X
t=0




Analogously, the expected value of entry for a Foreign rm is given by  





Since the potential number of entrants is unbounded, the expected value of entry and the
sunk entry cost are equal in equilibrium. Therefore, the free-entry conditions for Home and












Corollary 2 Let h(';'r) be a homogeneous of degree n function for '  'r (and zero oth-
erwise), and let g(') be dened as in section 3.2. Then, the unconditional expected value of
h(';'r) is Z 1
'r
h(';'r)g(')d' =  h'k
min'n k
r ;
where  h is a constant dened as in Lemma 1.
Given that the prot functions D(') and X(') are homogeneous of degree zero in (';'D)






















































The model is complete. We now solve for the equilibrium cuto productivity levels.
3.4 Solution of the Model
In this partial equilibrium model with xed wages, we use equations (8), (9), (18) and (19) to
solve for 'D, 'X, '
D, and '




















































W=Z |so that E is a combined measure of the relative cost of Foreign
eective labor and the relative Foreign entry cost|and 	r and 	
r, for r = fD;Xg, are positive
aggregate indexes reecting dierentiation, productivity dispersion, death likelihood, nominal
entry cost, and the destination country's income.23
From the equilibrium equations we see that the exchange rate must range between 1
k=(k+1)
and k=(k+1)
 in order to obtain positive equilibrium cuto levels.24 These bounds are a natural
consequence of the use of a demand system with an intercept on the price axis.
4 Exchange Rate Pass-Through in Partial Equilibrium
In this section I analyze the transmission of exchange rate movements to prices and trade ows.
I start by looking into the relationship between the exchange rate and the cuto productivity
levels. Then I see how this is reected in rm-level prices and trade ows. And nally I look at
the response of aggregate prices and trade ows.















for example, that more product dierentiation (lower ), higher death probability, and higher entry costs imply
lower cuto levels.
24This is a necessary but not sucient condition for an interior solution. To have an interior solution we also
need the equilibrium cuto levels to be greater than or equal to 'min|the lower bound for the distribution of
productivity.
164.1 The Cuto Levels and the Exchange Rate
As mentioned before, this model summarizes all the information about the production sector in
the cuto productivity levels. Therefore, to understand how an exchange rate change is reected
in prices, we must start rst by analyzing its impact on the cuto levels.
Let us focus on the the impact of exchange rate movements on the productivity cuto level
for Home rms selling domestically, 'D.
Proposition 2 (The cuto level 'D and the exchange rate)


















That is, 'D is strictly increasing and strictly convex in the exchange rate.
Analogously, we obtain that the cuto rule for Foreign rms selling domestically, '
D, is
decreasing and strictly convex in the exchange rate. That is, '
D;E < 0 and
@2'
D
@E2 > 0, where
'
D;E is the elasticity of '
D with respect to the exchange rate. Moreover, given the link between
the cuto productivity rules for domestic producers and the other country's exporters established
in equations (8) and (9), it follows that 'X and '
X are also convex in the exchange rate and
that their elasticities are given by
'
X;E ='D;E + 1 > 1 (24)
'X;E ='
D;E   1 <  1: (25)
That is, the exporting cuto productivity rules are elastic with respect to the exchange rate.
With a depreciation of the Home currency (an increase in E) and xed wages, Home rms
become more competitive in the Foreign market because the relative cost of Home eective labor,
W=Z
EW=Z, declines. The new prot opportunities abroad increase the entry of Home producers up
to the point at which the Home free-entry condition is satised. Meanwhile, entry declines at
Foreign because the prot opportunities from exporting decrease. In the new steady state, the
pre-entry expected prot from exporting|the second term in the left-hand side of equations (18)
and (19)|increases for Home producers and declines for Foreign producers. Therefore, in order
to satisfy the free-entry conditions, the pre-entry expected prot from domestic sales declines
for Home producers and increases for Foreign producers. From the rst term in the left-hand
side of equations (18) and (19), we know that this occurs if and only if 'D increases and '
D
decreases. Intuitively, the increase in entry at Home increases the pool of Home rms, NP, and
the decline in entry at Foreign reduces the pool of Foreign rms, N
P. Hence, in each market
there are two opposite eects in the degree of competition: the larger NP increases competition
from Home rms, and the smaller N
P decreases competition from Foreign rms. If trade costs
are suciently high so that an interior solution exists, the increase in competition due to the
17larger NP dominates in the Home market, and the decrease in competition due to the smaller
N
P dominates in the Foreign market.25 Therefore, 'D increases and '
D declines.
Given the direct proportional relationship between the cuto productivity rules and the
average productivity levels that we obtained in section 3.2, we get that the average productivity
of Home rms selling domestically increases after a Home-currency depreciation. The opposite
happens for Foreign rms selling in their own market. For the exporters, however, the story is
dierent. From equations (24) and (25) we see that '
X increases and 'X declines after a Home-
currency depreciation. Therefore, the average productivity of Foreign exporters increases and
the average productivity of Home exporters declines. Thus, Home rms that were not exporting
become internationally competitive due exclusively to the exchange rate change, displacing rms
in the Foreign country.
The second result from Proposition 2 concerns the convexity of 'D in E, which implies that
a Home-currency depreciation has a larger impact on 'D than a proportional appreciation. In
the same way, the convexity of '
D in E implies that a Foreign-currency depreciation (a decrease
in E) has a larger impact on '
D than a proportional appreciation. The asymmetric responses in
the cuto levels are then reected in asymmetric responses of trade ows and prices. Thus, it
is important to note that the result of the convexity of the cuto levels in the exchange rate is
robust to dierent specications of preferences. It holds, for example, with CES preferences (see
Appendix B (online)) and with the quasilinear-quadratic preferences of Melitz and Ottaviano
(2008).26
4.2 Pass-Through to Firm-Level Prices and Trade Flows
In sections 3.1.3 and 3.1.4 we obtained that the Home currency import price of a Foreign good
from a rm with productivity ' is given by
p













 1. Note that an exchange rate movement aects p
X(') through two
channels: (1) the direct eect on the rm's marginal cost in terms of the Home currency, EW
Z' ,
and (2) the indirect eect of the exchange rate movement on the markup, 
X('), which works






X be a measure of the relative position of the Foreign rm with productivity
' with respect to the cuto level '
X. Note that a Foreign rm exports if and only if u
X(')  1.
25This implies that for every Foreign rm that leaves the Home market after a Home-currency depreciation,
there is more than one Home rm|with productivity above the initial cuto level|to replace it. As N is constant,
so that each Foreign rm can only be replaced by one Home rm, 'D increases. The opposite happens in the
Foreign market.
26Also in Appendix B (online), I present the model in a structure that ts the translog, CES, and quasilinear-
quadratic preferences and show that in all cases, the pre-entry expected prot from selling domestically is concave
in the exchange rate and convex in the cuto level. It then follows that the cuto level must be convex in the
exchange rate.
27In the CES case, only the rst channel is present. This implies full exchange rate pass-through to rm-level
import prices.
18Therefore, the elasticity of p
X(') with respect to the exchange rate|that is, the pass-through
rate|is given by





X;E > 1 is as dened in equation (24), and 
X(') is the elasticity of 1 + 
X(') with
respect to u
X('), given in this case by

X(') =















, approaching 0 for the most productive Foreign exporters and ap-
proaching 1
2 for the least productive ones. It follows that 
X(') is strictly less than one. That
is, this model predicts incomplete exchange rate pass-through to rm-level import prices. More-
over, although 
X(') is bounded above by 1, it is not bounded below and can be negative. In-
deed, for every ', 
X(') is negative if and only if '
X;E > 1

X('). Note also that 1

X(') 2 [2;1),
so that there are no rm-level import prices with negative pass-through rates when '
X;E  2.
From equation (26), we can separate out two forces when the exchange rate changes: an
economy-wide eect|driven by '
X;E|which reects the change in the economy's competitive
environment; and a rm-specic eect|driven by 
X(')|which indicates the Foreign rm's
response to a change in its relative position with respect to the cuto level. The following
proposition states the model's main results regarding exchange rate pass-through to rm-level
import prices.
Proposition 3 (Exchange rate pass-through to rm-level import prices)
The rate of pass-through 
X(') is incomplete (less than 1) and
1. Increasing in productivity. That is, the import prices of the goods from more productive
rms have higher pass-through rates.
2. Decreasing in the exchange rate. That is, the rate of pass-through to rm-level import
prices is higher for appreciations than for depreciations of the Home currency.
The rst part of Proposition 3 is associated with the rm-specic eect. As we show in the
Appendix, this result is due to the negative relationship between 
X(') and '. Although more
productive Foreign rms set higher markups (
X(') is increasing in '), they also adjust them
proportionally less than less productive rms. That is, the markups of the least productive
Foreign exporters are more volatile, as they absorb a higher proportion of a shock to remain
competitive. The rm-specic eect is, however, sensitive to the choice of the utility function. In
Appendix B (online) I show that if we use the quasilinear-quadratic utility function of Melitz and
Ottaviano (2008), we obtain the opposite result: lower pass-through rates for high productivity
rms.28
28In Appendix B (online) I also show that if we use the linear approximation of Bergin and Feenstra (2000,
2001, 2009) to solve for the price in the translog case (see section 3.1.2), we assume away the rm-specic eect|


X(') = 0:5 for every '. With respect to the model's results with the quasilinear-quadratic utility function of
Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), see also footnote 20.
19If the Home-currency depreciates, Foreign exporters face a tougher competitive environment
at Home|in terms of higher average productivity of Home competitors|which is reected in
higher demand elasticities and lower markups. The opposite happens if the Home currency
appreciates; however, the second part of Proposition 3 states that the markup adjustment is
larger for a Home-currency depreciation than for a proportional appreciation. This asymmetry is
the result of both the economy-wide and the rm-specic eects, which reinforce each other. In
the proof of Proposition 3 in the Appendix, I show that an increase in the exchange rate increases
'
X;E and 
X('), causing then an unambiguous decline in 
X('). The positive relationship
between '
X;E and E is driven by the convexity of 'D in E described in the previous section.
On the other hand, the positive relationship between 
X(') and E stems from the shape of
the markup function. Given that the markup of a Foreign exporter with productivity ' is
increasing and concave in
'
'
X, an increase in '
X|due, for example, to a depreciation of the
Home currency|leads to a decrease in the markup that is proportionally larger than the markup
increase due to a similar decline in '
X. In other words, the rm-specic eect in this model
implies that the markup of a Foreign exporter is more responsive to increases than to decreases in
competition. The story of asymmetric exchange rate pass-through due to the dierent response
of markups is similar to the idea of asymmetric pass-through advanced by Froot and Klemperer
(1989) and Marston (1990). They suggest an asymmetric behavior of pass-through rates driven
by market share considerations: when exporters face a depreciation of the importer's currency,
they are willing to absorb in their prots an important amount of the shock in order to avoid
a substantial decrease in their market share; on the other hand, if an appreciation occurs, they
decrease their prices faster to capture a bigger share of the market.
Although exchange rate pass-through to rm-level import prices is not complete, the impact
of exchange rates on rm-level traded quantities is substantial and occurs at both the extensive
and intensive margins. For example, let us assume a Home-currency depreciation so that the
cuto rule for Home exporters ('X) declines and the cuto rule for Foreign exporters ('
X)
increases. At the extensive margin there are two channels of impact: (1) the Home rms
between the new and old cuto rules become exporters, and the Foreign rms between the old
and new cuto rules stop exporting; and (2) there is also an increase in Home exporters due to
higher entry of new rms (which expands the pool of Home rms), and a decrease in Foreign
exporters due to the decline in entry (which shrinks the pool of Foreign rms). At the intensive
margin, the original Home exporters increase their exports and the surviving Foreign exporters
decrease them. The opposite happens after a Home currency appreciation. In the remainder of
this section, I focus on the quantity and value of exports for Foreign exporters at the intensive
margin.
According to the results in section 3.1.3, the quantity that a Foreign rm with productivity
'  '

















20With an analogous denition for sr('), let s
r(') represent the market-share density in market
r of a Foreign rm with productivity ', for r 2 fD;Xg. Therefore, we can rewrite the value of
exports of a Foreign rm with productivity ' as p
X(')y
X(') = s
X(')I, where, as in equation
(7), s
X(') = 
X('). Based on these expressions, the following proposition presents the model's
main results regarding exchange rates and rm-level trade ows at the intensive margin.
Proposition 4 (The impact of the exchange rate on rm-level trade ows)
For a Foreign rm with productivity '  '
X:
1. The export quantity, y
X('), is decreasing and elastic with respect to the exchange rate.
That is, it declines more than 1% after a 1% Home-currency depreciation.
2. The value of its exports in terms of the Home currency, p
X(')y
X('), is decreasing in the
exchange rate, with an elasticity (in the interval ( 1;0)) that approaches 0 as ' ! 1.
Therefore, at the intensive margin, quantities always adjust in the expected direction after an
exchange rate movement. Moreover, the adjustment is higher in proportion than the exchange
rate change and occurs in the presence of incomplete exchange rate pass-through. Indeed, the
least productive Foreign exporters not only have the lower pass-through rates (absorbing more
of the exchange rate shock in their markups), but they also have to adjust their quantities more.
We can see this in the second part of Proposition 4, where the value of exports in terms of the
importer's (Home) currency is less elastic for more productive rms. As ' ! 1, the increase in
p
X(') after a Home-currency depreciation (with a pass-through rate close to 1) almost perfectly
osets the decline in the equilibrium quantity y
X('), so that the value of this rm's exports
remains almost constant.
4.3 Aggregate Pass-Through and Trade Flows







X(')g(' j '  '
X)d':
From equation (26) and Lemma 1, we obtain that
 
X = 1    (k)'
X;E; (28)
where  (k) is a constant in the interval (0:4037;0:5) depending only on the productivity dis-
persion parameter k.29 Thus, given that '
X;E is bounded below by 1, the maximum of  
X is
between 0.5 and 0.5963. From equation (28) we can also see that the average pass-through to
rm-level import prices is negative if '
X;E > 1
 (k). As shown in the previous section, markups
and marginal costs move in opposite directions after an exchange rate shock, and when '
X;E  2,
there will be Foreign rms for which markup adjustments due to the economy-wide competition





(xe)]dx is about 0.4037 for a k close to 1 and approaches 0.5 as k increases.
21eect dominate the marginal cost changes in terms of the importer's currency (resulting in a
negative pass-through rate). When the economy-wide eect is large enough|as reected in a
'
X;E higher than a constant (depending on k) in the interval (2;2:4770)|the result is a negative
average pass-through rate to rm-level import prices.
The rst result in Proposition 1 states that the average prices of imported and domestic
goods at Home,  p
X and  pD, are identical and equal to




If we obtain an aggregate import price weighted by market share, the result will be propor-
tional to  p.30 Therefore, I use the terms \average import price" and \aggregate import price"
indistinctly. The following proposition presents the result for exchange rate pass-through to the
aggregate import price.
Proposition 5 (Exchange rate pass-through to the aggregate import price)
The rate of pass-through of exchange rate changes to the average import price is given by

X =  'D;E < 0:
That is, the pass-through rate is always negative, implying a decrease in the average import price
from a Home-currency depreciation, and an increase from an appreciation.
Note that although the average pass-through to rm-level import prices in equation (28) is
only negative for high levels of E, so that '
X;E is high, the pass-through to the aggregate import
price is always negative. This surprising result is due to changes in the extensive margin of trade,
which are absorbed in the aggregation. For example, in the case of a Home-currency depreciation,
Foreign rms leave the Home market as they become less competitive. The surviving Foreign
exporters|who are the most productive and had lower prices before the exchange rate shock|
have to adjust their markups down because of the increase in competition coming from Home
entrants. The new average import price is then computed taking into account only the survivors.
In the end, average import prices reect the economy-wide competition eect, resulting in a lower
average price when competition increases and a higher price when it decreases.
The strong result in Proposition 5 holds for other types of preferences. It holds for the
quasilinear-quadratic preferences of Melitz and Ottaviano (2008), but it is also present in models
with exogenous markups. In particular, I show in Appendix B (online) that the result holds in a
model with CES preferences and a Pareto distribution of productivity. This is the brief example
mentioned in the introduction: a negative pass-through rate to the aggregate import price even
with rm-level pass-through rates of 1. The empirical evidence indicates, however, small but
positive pass-through rates to aggregate import prices. In section 6 I develop a brief extension
of the model that considers quality and reconciles the result in Proposition 5 with the empirical
evidence.
30In general, if the weight function is homogeneous of degree zero in (';'

X), we get by Lemma 1 that the
resulting weighted import price is proportional to  p. As seen in section 4.2, the market-share density for a Foreign




X('), which is homogeneous of degree zero.
22Let us now look into the expenditure-switching eect of exchange rates. From the previous
section we know that the market-share density for a Foreign rm with productivity ' in market
r, for r 2 fD;Xg, is given by s
r(') = 
r('). Analogously, sr(') = r('). Therefore, the
average market shares for Foreign and Home rms in market r are respectively  s
r =  
r and
 sr =  r. Using equation (13), we get then  sr =  s
r =  (k). By the result in Corollary 1,
N = N = 1
 (k), it is therefore the case that  sr =  s
r = 1
N = 1
N. This result implies that
the total market shares of Home sellers at Home and Foreign are, respectively, ND
N and NX
N .
Similarly, the total market shares of Foreign sellers are
N
X




Thus, in terms of the importer's currency, the value of Home exports is V E = NX
N I and the
value of Foreign exports is V E =
N
X
N I; that is, given that N, N, I, and I are constant, the
eect of an exchange rate movement on the value of trade (at both the intensive and extensive
margins) is summarized by the responses of NX and N
X. With respect to traded quantities,
we calculate the response of an aggregate export quantity to an exchange rate movement as the
dierence between the response of the value of exports and the response of the aggregate import
price (as given in Proposition 5). The following Proposition states our main results regarding
the expenditure-switching eect of exchange rates.
Proposition 6 (The impact of the exchange rate on aggregate trade ows)
The quantity and value of Home exports are increasing in the exchange rate, and the quantity
and value of Foreign exports are decreasing in the exchange rate. The exchange rate elasticities
of both quantities and values (in terms of the importer's currency) are in absolute value greater
than k.
Therefore, this model predicts large and unambiguous expenditure-switching eects of ex-
change rate movements. The trade ows move in the expected direction: the country with the
depreciating currency increases its exports, and the opposite happens in the country with the
appreciating currency.
The results obtained from Proposition 3 to Proposition 6 present a story of large expenditure-
switching eects of exchange rate movements at both margins of trade, in the presence of
incomplete pass-through rates to rm-level import prices and negative pass-through rates to
aggregate import prices. This suggests that|in a setting with rm heterogeneity, rm realloca-
tions, and endogenous markups|rm- and aggregate-level exchange rate pass-through studies
should not be used to make conclusions about the true expenditure-switching eects of exchange
rates. Moreover, aggregate import prices are subject to a composition bias|a sample selection
problem|due to changes in the extensive margin of trade. As a consequence, aggregate prices
can dier drastically from the average rm-level pass-through rate.
4.4 Model Summary
Figure 1 presents a graphical summary of the partial equilibrium model. I assume symmetric
countries and an initial exchange rate of 1, so that trade is balanced. Without loss of generality,
I set W, W, Z, Z, I, I, and 'min to 1. I also set k to 4,  to 1, fE and f
E to 0:2,  and 


















(a) International 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(b) Composition of sellers at Home
















(c) Pass-through to rm-level import prices


















(d) Prices at Home
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(f) Trade ows in the Home currency
Figure 1: Eects of Exchange Rate Changes in the Partial Equilibrium Model
24to 1.4, and  to 0.1.31
Panel 1a shows the relationship between the exchange rate and the pools of rms. A de-
preciation of the Home currency (an increase in E) changes the patterns of rm entry in both
countries, increasing the pool of rms at Home and lowering the pool of rms at Foreign. Panel
1b shows the composition of sellers at Home. As N is constant in this model, the Foreign
exporters that leave the Home market after a Home-currency depreciation are replaced by an
identical mass of Home rms.
Panel 1c shows the average exchange rate pass-through to Home rm-level import prices,  
X,
and the pass-through rate at Home for the average Foreign exporter in the initial equilibrium,

X( '
XjE=1). Note that rm-level pass-through rates are asymmetric: lower for depreciations
than for appreciations. More productive rms have higher pass-through rates and therefore,
the pass-through function of a Foreign exporter with a productivity higher than  '
XjE=1 lies
above the solid line for 
X( '
XjE=1). Panel 1d presents prices ^ p,  p, and p
X( '
XjE=1). Note that
the average Home import price,  p
X =  p (see Proposition 1), moves in the opposite direction of
the Home price of the average Foreign exporter. Then, although we observe positive average
pass-through rates to rm-level import prices, the pass-through rate to the aggregate import
price is negative.
I show the relationship between exchange rates and the markups of the initial equilibrium
average exporters in Panel 1e. When the Home-currency depreciates, the markup of the average
Foreign exporter declines and the markup of the average Home exporter increases. Moreover,
Panel 1e also shows changes at the intensive margin because, as shown in section 4.2, markups
are proportional to rm-level market-share densities and sales values.32 Thus, the model predicts
responses in the intensive margin of trade to exchange rate changes in the expected direction:
a Home exporter increases its exports after a Home-currency depreciation and the opposite
happens for a Foreign exporter. Finally, Panel 1f shows the Home-currency values of aggregate
trade ows. Again, movements in the exchange rate generate movements in aggregate trade ows
in the expected direction. After a Home-currency depreciation, even if rm- and aggregate-level
import prices have low (or even negative) rates of pass-through, the Home country improves its
trade balance through both an increase in exports and a decrease in imports.
5 The Model in General Equilibrium
In this section, I place the previous model into a new open economy macroeconomics (NOEM)
framework. As in Obstfeld and Rogo (2000), I assume short-run nominal rigidities in the form
of sticky wages. Wages are determined a period in advance, and exchange rate changes are
derived endogenously. This model shares the basic building blocks of the ex-price model of
Ghironi and Melitz (2005), with two important dierences: the incorporation of endogenous
markups and the introduction of nominal rigidities.
31As this is only a graphical summary of the model presented in the previous pages, I leave the description of
the parameters' values for the numerical simulation of the general equilibrium model in section 5.3.
32In this particular example, a rm's markup, market-share density, and sales value (in the destination country's
currency) are identical because I assume that , I, and I
 are equal to 1.
25The relationship between exchange rates and prices is in the core of NOEM models.33 In
particular, depending on the assumption of how a good's price is preset for its sale in another
country (producer currency pricing or local currency pricing), NOEM models yield dierent
conclusions with respect to the optimal monetary policy. Under producer currency pricing, the
optimal monetary policy involves exible exchange rates, while under local currency pricing the
conclusion is that the exchange rate must be xed (see Devereux and Engel, 2003).
As in the Mundell-Fleming model, the producer currency pricing assumption implies full
exchange rate pass-through to import prices|the law of one price and purchasing power parity
(PPP) hold|and large expenditure-switching eects. In contrast, under local currency pric-
ing the good's price is preset in the currency of the destination country, which implies a zero
pass-through rate and no expenditure-switching eects. As mentioned in the introduction, the
evidence of low pass-through to prices makes the case for local currency pricing stronger. How-
ever, we have shown in section 4 that, contrary to the local currency pricing implication, low
pass-through rates can coexist with large expenditure-switching eects of exchange rates.
In my NOEM model, goods prices are fully exible and any perceived stickiness (at the rm or
aggregate level) is the result of rms adjusting their markups and/or changes in the composition
of sellers. The model keeps the basic structure of the partial equilibrium version. There are
two countries, Home and Foreign, each of them populated by a continuum of households in
the interval [0,1]. Households provide labor to a unique production sector in the economy
that produces dierentiated goods. These goods are produced under monopolistic competition
by heterogeneous producers. To justify short-run wage rigidities, the NOEM model adds the
assumption that households are monopolistic suppliers of labor.34
In the rest of the section I esh out the model. I rst describe the preferences of the
representative household, and then I describe production, labor demand, and the household's
budget constraint. I then compute the Euler equations and present the nal equations that close
the model. Finally, I solve the model for an unexpected monetary shock and do an exchange
rate pass-through analysis. As before, Foreign variables are denoted with a star (*). Again, in




Consider a dynamic and stochastic model in which households in both countries have the same
preferences over consumption, money and labor. The intertemporal utility function for the
33These are general equilibrium models that incorporate microeconomic foundations, imperfect competition,
nominal rigidities, and allow for welfare analysis. See Lane (2001) for a survey of the rst generation of NOEM
models.
34Also related to the model in this section, Corsetti and Dedola (2005) introduce a NOEM model with nom-
inal wage rigidities and endogenous markups stemming from the existence of (nontraded-goods intensive) local
distribution services.






















where Cj is the real consumption index, Mj
P represents real money balances, and `(j) is the
amount of labor devoted to production. Also,  2 (0;1) is the discount factor,  is a money
velocity parameter, and  is a weighting parameter for the disutility of labor.
The real consumption index Cj corresponds to the homothetic utility function over dieren-
tiated goods implied by the translog expenditure function in equation (1). The deator of money
balances P is the money price of a unit of Cj. That is, P (the price index) is the minimum
















lnpi(lnpj   lnpi)djdi: (31)
The last term in the utility function corresponds to the disutility of labor. Household j's
labor is dierentiated and monopolistically supplied for the production of the dierentiated
goods. This characteristic of the model implies an equilibrium household's labor supply that is
below the ecient level, which provides the underpinnings for short-run wage stickiness.
5.1.2 Production and Labor Demand
The production of each good demands every type of labor in the interval [0;1]. The production










That is, the labor index L follows a Dixit-Stiglitz technology, where  > 1 is the elasticity
of substitution between the dierent types of labor. It follows that the demand for type j's












1  is the price of labor index Lt, and LD
t is the total labor demand at
Home.
The description of the production sector continues as in sections 3.1 and 3.2, with some
minor modications. In particular, we need to include time subscripts and replace I and I
with PtCt and P
t C
t , respectively. We can also derive an expression for Pt in terms of the cuto
productivity level 'D;t. Substituting the pricing equations from section 3.1.3 into equation (31),





27where  (k) is a constant less than one.35 That is, Pt is proportional to ^ pt and  pt.
The free-entry conditions in the NOEM model dier from the ones in section 3.3. The value
of entry at Home at time t is now given by  t + vt, where  t =  D;t + Et X;t is the pre-entry
expected prot for time t, and vt is the present value of the expected future stream of prots.












where   =
 (k)'k
min
k+1 . As I show later, the new term vt is given by




( t+1 + vt+1)

:
With parallel equations for the value of entry in the Foreign country, the free-entry conditions
in the NOEM model are













Let us now derive an expression for the total labor demand. The demand for labor at time t
has two components: the labor demand related to new rms' entry costs, and the labor demand
coming from the rms that are actually producing. The former is given by NE;t
fE;t













g(' j '  'X;t)d':













To conclude the model setup, I now describe the representative household's budget con-
straint.
5.1.3 Household Budget Constraint
In this model, current account imbalances may exist because international trade in bonds is
possible: Home and Foreign households can hold Home and Foreign risk-free bonds denominated





t holdings of the Home and Foreign bonds, respectively. Bond holdings at the end of t




t+1. Real interest rates from t to t+1 are given by rt+1 and r
t+1. For the
model to be stationary, we follow Ghironi and Melitz (2005), hereafter GM, and assume a small












xk+1 dx   1
i
ranges between 0.5082 (for a k close to 1) and 1 (for a high k).








t+1)2 for holding Home and Foreign bonds,
respectively.
The ownership structure of rms is based on GM. Each country has a mutual fund that owns
all the rms in that country and that nances the entry of new rms. Households can buy shares
only in the domestic mutual fund, so that Home households can only be owners of Home rms,
and Foreign households can only be owners of Foreign rms. The composition of rms in the
mutual funds changes each period, as some rms die and some rms enter. The representative
Home household j begins time t with x
j
t shares of last period's mutual fund, which comprises
the pool of rms given by NP;t 1. A fraction  of the rms die at the end of t 1, so that Home
household j receives x
j
t(1   )NP;t 1 t as dividends from the surviving rms at time t. The
mutual fund nances the entry of NE;t rms, with a nancing cost of NE;t
fE;tWt
Zt (equivalent to
NE;t( t +vt) by equation (35)). Also at time t, Home household j can adjust to x
j
t+1 its shares
in the mutual fund|now comprised of NP;t = (1   )NP;t 1 + NE;t rms. The present value of
time-t's mutual fund is then NE;t t+NP;tvt, where the rst term represents the time-t prots of
the new entrants and the second term represents the present value of the fund's expected future







t+1NE;t( t + vt) to the mutual fund and receives x
j
t(1   )NP;t 1 t + x
j
t+1NE;t t in dividends.
The other components of the budget constraint are consumption expenditure, labor income,
tax payments, and money holdings. For labor income, Home household j receives a nominal
wage wt(j) for each unit of labor provided. On the other hand, it pays lump-sum taxes in the
amount of T
j
t and maintains M
j
t in nominal money balances.


























= Pt(1 + rt)A
j
t + EtP
t (1 + r
t)B
j
t + wt(j)`t(j) + x
j
t(1   )NP;t 1 ( t + vt) + M
j
t 1; (38)
with an analogous expression holding for the representative Foreign household.
5.2 Closing the Model
5.2.1 First-Order Conditions
We now solve the household maximization problem. The representative Home household j
maximizes the intertemporal utility function (30) subject to the budget constraint (38) and







t . The nominal wage is set a period in advance.








t , and wt+1(j)|the Euler









36The model of GM includes a one-period time-to-build assumption. Therefore, entrants do not make prots













































Pt is the real exchange rate at time t. I dropped the superscript j from the Euler
equations, and replaced wt+1 with Wt+1 and `t+1 with Lt+1|as every household receives the
same wage and oers the same amount of labor in the symmetric equilibrium. Parallel equations
hold for the Foreign country.
As equilibrium labor is below its ecient level (because households are monopolistic labor
suppliers), labor is demand determined in the presence of suciently small shocks and wage
stickiness, as the wage will still be above the value of the marginal disutility of labor. In other
words, the labor-leisure Euler equation (43) does not bind in the short-run|at the time of the
shock|because wages are sticky.
5.2.2 Net Foreign Assets
I need to establish two more conditions. First, internationally traded bonds are in zero net
supply, that is,
At+1 + A
t+1 = 0 (44)
Bt+1 + B
t+1 = 0: (45)
Second, let us derive the net foreign assets condition from the aggregate budget constraints.
I assume that the government's only role is to use transfers to distribute to households the










t+1 + (Mt   Mt 1) + Tt = 0:
With a similar expression at Foreign, we get that the Home and Foreign aggregate budget
constraints are respectively given by
PtAt+1 + EtP
t Bt+1 = Pt(1 + rt)At + EtP
t (1 + r




















P;t 1(1   ) 
t;
where we use that
NE;t =NP;t   (1   )NP;t 1 (46)
N
E;t =N
P;t   (1   )N
P;t 1: (47)
30Following GM, we multiply the Foreign aggregate budget constraint by Et, and then we substitute
the zero-net-supply conditions for bonds. Subtracting the resulting expression from the Home
aggregate budget constraint, we get that Home's net foreign asset position at the end of time t
in terms of the Home currency, NFAt, is given by
PtAt+1 + EtP
t Bt+1 =Pt(1 + rt)At + EtP





























The model is complete. We have a system of 31 equations ((8)-(9), (14)-(17), (33)-(37),




t , Wt+1, W
t+1, Et,  t,  
t, Ct, C









t+1, rt+1, and r
t+1. The model's exogenous variables are
Mt, M
t , Zt, Z
t , t, 
t , fE;t, and f
E;t.37
5.3 A Permanent Monetary Shock
In this section I consider the eect of a permanent 1 percent monetary shock at Home. For this
purpose, I assume that money supplies at Home and Foreign follow the processes





where t+1 and 
t+1 are normal white noise processes with standard deviation &.
As shown in section 4, this model has important second-order eects (asymmetries in the
responses of variables of interest to appreciations and depreciations of a currency). Given that
a traditional linear-approximation solution method loses these eects, I solve the model using
Sims's second-order accurate solution method, described in Kim et al. (2008).38
The model assumes sticky wages and rm entry and exit. In section 2 we discussed evidence
on wage stickiness and entry and exit of rms even at one-year horizons. Therefore, I choose
parameter values to resemble a period length of one year. The relevant period-length parameters
are the discount factor, , and the death rate, . For quarterly data, GM set  to 0.99 (the usual
choice) and  to 0.025. Thus, I set annual values of 0:96 for  and 0:1 for .39 Following Bergin
and Feenstra (2009), I set the substitutability parameter of the translog expenditure function,
, to 1. For the parameters of the productivity distribution, I set 'min to 1 (as GM) and the
productivity dispersion parameter, k, to 4 (rounding up the 3.4 value that GM use). The value
37Appendix B (online) includes a table that shows the system of 31 equations of the NOEM model.
38I thank Robert Kollmann for providing me with the Matlab codes from his paper titled \Monetary Policy
Rules in the Open Economy: Eects on Welfare and Business Cycles" (JME, 2002) for the implementation of
Sims's gensys2 algorithm.
39From the literature review in section 2, we have that with a 14% annual rate of job destruction of total U.S.
employment and with death of rms accounting for a proportion as high as 66% of total job destruction, a 10%
annual death rate is appropriate for this model. GM also argue that a 10% annual death rate is appropriate
given that their model|like this one|does not model explicitly multi-product rms and the death shock is at
the product level.
31of |from the intertemporal utility function|is only relevant to determine the level of the
nominal variables. Thus, I set  = 0:1 so that, in combination with the initial levels of money
supplies, the total consumption expenditure in both countries at the initial steady state is 1.
Following Bilbiie, Ghironi, and Melitz (2007b), I set the labor market parameter values,  (the
elasticity of substitution between the dierent types of labor) and  (the parameter that weights
the disutility of labor in the intertemporal utility function), so that the equilibrium level of labor
in the initial steady state is about 1 in both countries. Hence, I set  = 5 and  = 0:75. For
this numerical exercise I assume that the only uncertainty comes from the money supplies|that
is, aggregate productivities, sunk entry costs, and trade costs are constant. In particular, I set
Zt = Z
t = 1, fE;t = f
E;t = 0:2, and t = 
t = 1:4 for every t. The value for the aggregate
productivities is normalized without any loss of generality. The value for the sunk entry cost
is set so that about 20% of the pool of rms in each country are exporters in the initial steady
state.40 The value for the iceberg trade costs is higher than the value set by GM (they use 1.3),
but it is not unrealistically high, considering that in this model Home and Foreign producers sell
directly to nal consumers and distribution costs in the destination country can be very large.41
For the money supplies' stochastic processes, I assume that the standard deviation, &, is 0.001.
Finally, the bond-holding cost parameter, , is set|as in GM|to 0.0025.
Let time 0 be the initial and symmetric steady state, with money supplies M0 and M
0 equal
to 2.5. In this steady state, bond holdings are zero, trade is balanced, PPP holds, and the
real (and nominal) interest rate is
1 
 in each country. At the beginning of time 1 there is a
permanent and unexpected 1% increase in the Home money supply. Given that wages are set
a period in advance, there are short-run real eects of the monetary expansion. Wages then
adjust to capture the monetary shock, and the transition to the new steady state begins. In the
new steady state only the Home nominal variables change (money is neutral in the long run),
and we go back to a position of nancial autarky. It is important to note that the new steady
state cannot be reached at time 2, as time 1 eects include rm reallocations that take time to
dissipate, increasing the persistence of the monetary shock. Figure 2 presents the dynamics of
the model. The horizontal axis represents time in years and, with the exception of the last two
subgures, the variables' responses represent percent deviations from the initial steady state.
At the initial steady state the nominal exchange rate is 1|as given by the ratio of Home
and Foreign money supplies. At time 1, the nominal exchange rate rises by about one-third
of a percentage point. It then starts to converge towards its new steady state of 1.01. At the
time of the shock, the eects of the Home monetary expansion on real variables work through
two channels: the increase in Home households' demand and the depreciation of the Home
currency. In the partial equilibrium model, this is equivalent to simultaneous increases in I
and E. For Home rms, the rst channel increases prot opportunities from Home sales, and
the second channel increases prot opportunities from exporting, driving up the entry of Home
rms. The rise in Home entry increases the pool of Home rms by about 5:5%, and the increase
40In this respect, I follow closely GM, who set xed export costs and sunk entry costs so that about 21% of
rms export. As mentioned before, my model does not need to impose xed costs.
41For example, Burstein, Neves, and Rebelo (2003) nd that local distribution costs account for 40% of retail














































































































































































































































































































































































































2 Figure 2: Responses to a 1% Increase in the Home Money Supply
33in competition then drives up the cuto level, 'D, by about 0:9%. On the other hand, pushed
by the increase in competition at Home and by the lower level of competitiveness of Foreign
rms due the Home-currency depreciation, the pool of rms declines at Foreign by about 2%.
With the decline in N
P, the cuto level, '
D, declines about 0:1%. As expected, 'X and '
X
move in the direction (but in a higher proportion) of '
D and 'D, respectively. With respect
to the composition of sellers, the increase in ND and the decline in N
D are close to 2%, which
corresponds|given that in this model the number of sellers in each market is constant|to an
increase in Home exporters and a decline of Foreign exporters of about 7%.
Given the wage rigidity and equation (33), it follows that the aggregate price P falls at time
1 in the same proportion as the increase in 'D (about 0.9%). As nominal consumption expen-
diture at Home increases by 1% due to the permanent monetary expansion, Home consumption
then increases by about 1.9% at the time of the shock. The time 1 elastic response of Home
consumption to the monetary shock is always present in this model, as the Home aggregate price
always declines with the monetary expansion. Meanwhile, at Foreign there is a slight increase
in P (about 0.1%) due to the decrease in '
D, and a similar decline in consumption.
The movements in aggregate prices, along with the exchange rate change, generate strong
deviations from PPP: the real exchange rate Q increases about 1.3% at the time of the 1% Home
monetary expansion. Moreover, the impact on trade ows is large. From balanced trade at time
0, the trade balance of Home|dened as TBt = EtV Et   V E
t for time t|jumps to a surplus
of about 2.8% of total consumption expenditure at time 1, improving Home's net foreign asset
position in the same proportion.
As the Home wage adjusts to reect the monetary expansion, the transition to the new steady
state begins. However, the transition is slow because the rm reallocations that happened at
time 1 take several periods to vanish (for real variables, it takes about ve periods to reduce
most of the gap between time-1 levels and steady-state levels). The wage also increases slightly
at Foreign, as the demand for labor in that country is above the steady-state level during the
transition.
Also in the transition, we see that P moves above the initial steady-state level starting
in time 3 and converges slowly to its new steady state. The slow convergence is also seen
in Home consumption, which remains well above its steady-state level for several periods as
Home is receiving interest payments from abroad. The opposite happens at Foreign, though
initial movements in consumption are much smaller. With respect to the real exchange rate,
deviations from PPP are very persistent and it takes about ve periods for Q to be close to 1
again. The trade balance is in surplus for four periods, is about zero at time 5, and moves to
decit for the rest of the transition. Home's net foreign asset position reaches its peak at time
6, and then begins to decrease slowly towards zero.
This concludes the general description of the model's solution. In Appendix B (online) I
provide an extensive sensitivity analysis. For a wide range of parameter values, the model's
responses are similar to the description above. I also analyze the model's responses to transitory
and permanent productivity shocks. Again, in the case of a transitory productivity shock,
the model features substantial rm reallocations, creating a high degree of persistence. For a
34permanent productivity shock, the economy jumps immediately to the new steady state.
As a note of caution, although there is strong evidence of the procyclical behavior of rm
entry (see section 2), the changes in entry patterns at the time of the shock generated in this
model|reected in the sizes of the pools of rms|are very large. We must note, however,
that the structure of this model was kept at the minimum level in order to present with clarity
the main forces at work and their implications for the pass-through and expenditure-switching
eects of exchange rates. In particular, my NOEM model abstracts from more complex features
of calibrated DSGE models that may dampen the entry channel, e.g. Calvo-adjustment mecha-
nisms and/or the addition of more sectors (a nontradable sector is particularly relevant in open
economy macroeconomics). These are features that must be considered if we want to calibrate
the model to the U.S. or any other economy, or if we want to study the model's implications for
optimal monetary policy.
5.4 Exchange Rate Pass-Through in General Equilibrium
Proposition 1 states that the average price for Home goods sold at Home  pD is equivalent
to the average price of imports at Home  p
X, with  p representing the common average price.
Similarly, the import price index at Home at time t is equivalent to the general price index,
Pt. Therefore, from Figure 2 we observe that the aggregate import price falls at Home and
increases at Foreign at the time of the sudden Home-currency depreciation generated by the
Home monetary expansion. That is, as in the partial equilibrium model, we have negative rates
of pass-through to aggregate import prices of exchange rate changes.42 At the same time, the
monetary expansion has large and persistent expenditure-switching eects: the depreciating
currency country runs trade balance surpluses that last four periods, and its net foreign asset
position reaches about 6% of total consumption expenditure by time 6.
The short-run behavior of rm-level import prices also follows closely the partial equilibrium
results. Let us focus on how identical exporters from Home and Foreign respond to the Home
monetary expansion. The average productivities of exporters from Home and Foreign at time t
are given by  'X;t and  '
X;t, respectively. At time 0, the initial and symmetric steady state,  'X;0
and  '
X;0, are equal|the average Home exporter is identical to the average Foreign exporter.
Figure 3 presents the dynamics of markups, prices, quantities, and export values for these
identical exporters when there is a 1% Home monetary expansion at time 1. The horizontal axis
represents time in years.
Panel 3a presents the responses of markups as the markup dierence between time t and
time 0. Under our assumed parameter values, the average exporter markup at time 0 is 14.9%.
Hence, for example, the 0.2% markup response at time 1 for the time-0 average Home exporter
implies a 15.1% markup. On the other hand, the downward adjustment of the average Foreign
exporter's markup, 
X( '
X;0), is much stronger, decreasing by about 0.6% at the time of the
shock. As wages adjust, markups go back to their original steady-state levels.
42As mentioned before, although the negative pass-through result (and the implied large response in Home
consumption) is controversial, the simple extension of the model in section 6 shows that if we distinguish between
quality- and non-quality-adjusted prices and quantities, the previous results are true for quality-adjusted variables,
while conventional responses may hold for non-quality-adjusted variables.














(a) Markups over marginal cost












(b) Prices in destination country's currency





































(d) Value of exports in exporter's currency
Figure 3: Responses of Time-0 Average Exporters to a 1% Home Monetary Expansion
The responses of variables in Panels 3b, 3c, and 3d represent percent deviations from the
initial steady state. Panel 3b shows the responses of average exporters' prices in terms of the
destination country's currency. At the time of the shock, both prices decrease. That is, although
the average Home exporter lowers its price in the Foreign country at the time of the sudden
Home-currency depreciation (and still manages to increase its markup), the average Foreign
exporter also lowers its price at Home. This dierence from the partial equilibrium model|
where the average exporter has positive pass-through rates in both countries|stems from the
impact of the monetary expansion on Home expenditure (recall that in the partial equilibrium
model, a monetary expansion at Home is equivalent to simultaneous increases in E and I). As
mentioned in section 5.3, the rise in money supply under sticky wages generates new prot
opportunities at Home, increasing entry and competition and therefore reinforcing the upward
eect on the Home cuto productivity level, 'D. The competition eect is so strong that the
downward markup adjustment of the average Foreign exporter implies a price at Home below
the original steady state. As money is neutral in the long-rung, p
X( '
X;0) is 1% higher in the
36new steady state and pX( 'X;0) returns to its original level. During the transition, however,
pX( 'X;0) follows the Home wage level response and is above the steady-state level.
Changes in the intensive margin are large. Panel 3c shows the responses of export quantities,
and Panel 3d presents the responses of the export values (in terms of the producer's currency).
At the time of the shock, the quantity and the value of exports of the average Home exporter
increase by more than 1.5%. Meanwhile, the quantity and the value of exports of the average
Foreign exporter decline by about 3% and 3.5%, respectively. In the transition, as the cuto
productivity levels adjust so that the Foreign country can run trade surpluses in order to pay its
external debt, the export quantity of the average Foreign exporter moves above the steady-state
level (and below the steady-state level for the average Home exporter) and slowly converges back.
The values of exports reect the changes in quantities and move slowly to the corresponding
steady-state nominal levels.
In sum, the Home monetary expansion generates a Home-currency depreciation and large
expenditure-switching eects. Firm- and aggregate-level prices are largely disconnected from
the exchange rate. Therefore, results of exchange rate pass-through to prices are not reliable
indicators of movements in trade ows.
6 A Quality Extension
The result in Proposition 5 states that the rate of pass-through of exchange rates to aggregate
import prices is negative. The result continues to hold at the time of the shock in the general
equilibrium model. Empirically, however, the evidence is that pass-through rates are small but
positive. In this section I show that a simple extension of the model that considers quality
reconciles the model's results with the empirical facts.
The model in the previous sections does not consider quality explicitly. However, the quality
of a good is also an important determinant of its demand and therefore, a natural extension to the
model is to assume that consumers when dene their preferences, they are taking into account
quality-adjusted prices. Indeed, recent theoretical and empirical research with heterogeneous
rms looks at the implications of quality heterogeneity for unit and quality-adjusted prices (e.g.,
Baldwin and Harrigan (2009) and the references cited therein).43
Following this literature, I assume that rms are heterogeneous in two characteristics: pro-
ductivity (in terms of marginal costs) and product quality. In the terminology of Sutton (2007),
the combination of the productivity and quality of a rm determines its capability. Therefore,
the tradability of a good in a market depends on the capability of its producer as compared to
that market's capability cuto level. Moreover, if we just replace the word \productivity" by
\capability" in the previous sections, we can see the model above as one based in quality-adjusted
prices. As such, most of the notation is the same as before and we just have to redene a few
variables: for example, ' now represents capability instead of productivity, ^ p is the maximum
quality-adjusted price that can be set at Home, and pr(') represents the quality-adjusted price
43See also Auer and Chaney (2009) for a model of exchange rate pass-through and quality pricing in a setting
of perfect competition and decreasing returns to scale.
37in market r of a Home rm with capability '.
6.1 The Model with Quality
The representative Home household denes its preferences over a continuum of quality-adjusted
dierentiated goods in the set . As in section 3.1.1, 0 is the subset of goods that are actually
available for purchase at Home and has measure N. Preferences are obtained from equation
(1), where pi =
~ pi
i is now the quality-adjusted price of good i, i denotes its quality, and ~ pi






its quality-adjusted demand is given by qi = si
I
pi. Moreover, qi = i~ qi, where ~ qi is the regular
demand (the amount of physical units demanded) for good i. The prot-maximization problem
of rm i, with marginal cost mci, yields the unit price equation







where i^ p is the maximum unit price that rm i can set at Home.
Firms are heterogeneous in quality and productivity, and these factors jointly determine
the capability of the rm. In particular, ' denotes the capability of a rm and is given by
' = z, where  denotes quality and z denotes productivity. Then, the marginal cost of a
Home rm with capability ' is W
Zz = W
Z', with W and Z dened as before. The rest of the
model setup is identical to section 3.1. We only need to add the expressions for the unit prices
and the equilibrium quantities, which are given by ~ pr(';) = pr(') and ~ yr(';) =
yr(')
 , for
r 2 fD;Xg. Parallel expressions hold for a Foreign rm with capability ' and quality .
Following Johnson (2009), I assume that the relationship between quality and capability
is given by  = ', with  > 0, so that higher capability is related to higher quality ( = 0
corresponds to the homogeneous quality case).44 Then, the model simplies to a single dimension
of heterogeneity in capability. Rewriting the unit price equations for a Home rm with capability
' we get
~ pD(') = (1 + D('))
W
Z




Therefore, the unit price (~ pr(')) and the quality-adjusted price (pr(')) are negatively correlated









'r.45 That is, although the
quality-adjusted price always decreases with capability, the unit price increases with capability
if  is suciently high.46
44Among others, Baldwin and Harrigan (2009) and Kugler and Verhoogen (2008) assume a similar relationship
between quality and capability. As mentioned by Baldwin and Harrigan (2009) and Johnson (2009), we can also
derive this power function relationship in a model with endogenous quality.
45In the CES case r(') = 0 because markups are exogenous. Therefore, with CES preferences a negative
correlation exists between the unit price and the quality-adjusted price if and only if  > 1.
46Recent empirical evidence provides support for a positive relationship between unit prices and capability
(implying a suciently high ). Using plant-level data from Colombia, Kugler and Verhoogen (2008) nd that
output prices are positively correlated with plant size and export status (which are indicators of capability). In
the lines of Hummels and Klenow (2005), they infer that this is consistent with more capable plants producing
higher-quality goods and charging higher unit prices. Johnson (2009) provides similar evidence using aggregate
38Assuming that capability follows a Pareto distribution with dispersion parameter k, the rest
of the results in section 3 hold. We only need to derive a couple of results regarding average unit
prices. Let  ~ pr and  ~ p
r denote, respectively, the average unit prices of Home and Foreign goods
in market r, for r 2 fD;Xg. The following proposition presents the new results:
Proposition 7 (Non-equivalence of average unit prices)
The average unit prices of domestic and imported goods are not equal. In particular:  ~ pD =
#(k;)W
Z ' 1







 ~ pD,  ~ p
D = #(k;)W
Z ' 1







D, where #(k;) is
a constant.47
Therefore, although Proposition 1 holds for quality-adjusted average prices, average unit
prices for domestic and imported goods at Home and Foreign are dierent as long as 'D 6= '
X
and '
D 6= 'X. As example, with identical costs of eective labor so that '
X > 'D due only to
the trade cost,  ~ p
X >  ~ pD because imported goods at Home are on average of higher quality than
domestic goods (as Foreign exporters are on average more capable|hence producing higher
quality goods|than Home rms selling domestically). It follows that the average unit price at
Home is given by  ~ p = ND
N  ~ pD +
N
X
N  ~ p
X, with an analogous expression holding for  ~ p.
6.2 Quality and Exchange Rates
In this section I present the quality-model implications for exchange rate pass-through to rm-
and aggregate-level unit prices and regular quantities. I also contrast these results with the
results in Propositions 3, 4, 5, and 6, which should be read for this section as corresponding to
quality-adjusted prices and quantities (also, the word \productivity" in each of these propositions
must be replaced by \capability").
























so that it is also the case that





@ lnE , where y
X(') is as given in section 4.2.








as Propositions 3 and 4 hold for the quality-adjusted price, p
X('), and the quality-adjusted
quantity, y








39Proposition 8 (Exchange rate pass-through to rm-level unit import prices, quan-
tities, and trade ows)
For a Foreign rm with capability '  '
X we have that, after replacing the word \produc-
tivity" by \capability", Propositions 3 and 4 hold for the Home-currency unit price, ~ p
X('), and
export quantity, ~ y
X(').
Thus, our original rm-level results are unaected by the extension with quality: (1) the
rates of pass-through of exchange rate movements to rm-level quality- and non-quality-adjusted
import prices are identical, incomplete, increasing in capability, and asymmetric; and (2) rm-
level quality- and non-quality-adjusted traded quantities are elastic with respect to the exchange
rate and move in the expected direction.
Given that ~ 
X(') = 
X('), it follows that the average pass-through rate to rm-level unit
import prices at Home,  ~ 
X, is identical to  
X in equation (28) (the average pass-through rate
to rm-level quality-adjusted import prices). Proposition 5 holds for the aggregate quality-
adjusted import price at Home, so that the disconnect between 
X(') and 
X continues to
exist. In the same way, Proposition 6 holds for aggregate quality-adjusted quantities, and the
results for the values of trade ows are unaected. Therefore, we only need to establish the
quality-model implications for the eect of exchange rates on aggregate unit import prices and
traded quantities.
Proposition 9 (Exchange rate pass-through to aggregate unit import prices and quan-
tities)
1. The rate of pass-through of an exchange rate movement to the aggregate unit import price
at Home is ~ 
X =  + (   1)'D;E:
2. The aggregate (non-quality-adjusted) quantity of Home exports is increasing in the ex-
change rate, and the aggregate quantity of Foreign exports is decreasing in the exchange
rate. The exchange rate elasticities of these quantities are in absolute value greater than
k + .
Note that if  < 1, ~ 
X is positive as long as 
1  > 'D;E. Moreover, there is full pass-
through if  = 1 and more than full pass-through (~ 
X > 1) if  > 1. Thus, the model with
quality derives a positive pass-through rate to the aggregate unit import price at Home if 
is suciently high. Note also that this aggregate pass-through rate is disconnected from the
average pass-through to rm-level unit import prices,  ~ 
X.
The model with quality can be further extended to a NOEM framework with similar results.
In the quality-extended NOEM model, P and C are quality-adjusted price and consumption
indexes. Thus, although the response of quality-adjusted consumption can be large|as obtained
in section 5.3 at the time of the monetary shock|the response of the non-quality-adjusted
consumption index can be substantially smaller and the unit price index can increase or decrease.
407 Conclusion
Exchange rate pass-through studies are probably the most popular empirical topic in interna-
tional macroeconomics. Often, results on pass-through rates are used to make inferences about
the expenditure-switching eect of exchange rates. However, the link between pass-through and
trade ows is only valid if the impact of exchange rates on the supply side is negligible. In this
paper the supply side takes a central role.
I presented partial and general equilibrium versions of a sticky-wage model of exchange rate
pass-through with monopolistic competition, heterogeneous rms, and endogenous markups.
Exchange rate movements aect international competitive conditions and alter rms' pricing
and production decisions. The model derives results consistent with low|and even negative|
levels of exchange rate pass-through to rm- and aggregate-level import prices and substantial
expenditure-switching eects.
At the aggregate level, the model shows that aggregate import prices are subject to a compo-
sition bias due to changes in the extensive margin of trade. At the rm level, each producer sets
its markup in each market taking into account its own productivity and the market's competitive
conditions. After an exchange rate shock, each rm is subject to two dierent but reinforcing
eects: a rm-specic eect, related to a rm's own productivity; and an economy-wide eect,
which is the same for all rms competing in the same market. Moreover, the magnitude of these
eects depends on the direction of the exchange rate change, generating asymmetric responses
of rm-level prices for appreciations and depreciations of a currency. Even with the adjustments
in markups after an exchange rate shock, there are important changes in the intensive margin
of trade.
The general equilibrium model preserves the basic results of the partial equilibrium version
and provides rich transition dynamics. We observe how rm reallocations at an international
level increase the persistence of exogenous shocks, as changes in the pool of producers dissipate
slowly during the transition.
The results of this model provide a potential explanation for the disconnect between import
prices and exchange rates in developed economies. The model also highlights the relevance of
exchange rates for international rm reallocations and the eects of those reallocations on a
country's trade balance and net foreign asset position.
41A Appendix
A.1 Proofs of Lemmas and Propositions
Proof of Lemma 1. Let h(';'r) be a homogeneous of degree n function so that h(b';b'r) =















'r, we can rewrite equation (A-1) as
h(';'r) = 'n
rh(x;1): (A-2)
We now do a change of variables in the integral
R 1
'r h(';'r)g(' j '  'r)d' in terms of x and
substitute equation (A-2) to get
Z 1
'r






















Proof of Proposition 1. For part 1, we obtain rst  pD. From section 3.1.3 we know that
pD(') = (1 + D(')) W
Z'. Substituting D(') for the corresponding expression from equation











which is homogeneous of degree -1 in (';'D). Then, using Lemma 1 we obtain that the average
price of Home goods available for purchase at Home is









xk+2 dx is a constant less than 1, depending only on the parameter k. In
the same way, the Home average price of imported goods is  p
X = #(k)EW
Z'
X . From equation





X =  pD. Given that the average price of all goods available for purchase at Home,  p, is just a
weighted linear combination of  pD and  p
X, it must be the case that  p =  pD =  p
X. Following
the same steps, we obtain  p =  p
D =  pX = #(k) W
Z'
D.
For part 2, we obtain rst lnpD. From equation (6) we know that lnpD(') = ln ^ p   D(').









42Note that we can also get to this expression by taking the natural logarithm in equation (A-3)
and using the property ln[
(x)] = lnx   
(x) for x > 0 of the Lambert W function along with
equation (10). Then, for lnpD =
R 1
















   (k); from equation (13):
In the same way, we have lnp
X(') = ln ^ p   
X('). From the zero-cuto-markup conditions we
get ^ p = W
Z'D = EW
Z'








   (k) = lnpD. Therefore, the average log-price at Home is lnp = lnpD = lnp

X.
















   (k) =
ln ^ p   (k). Rearranging we have ln(^ p) lnp =  (k). Now, from equation (2) we solve for N to
get N = 1
(ln(^ p) lnp). Therefore, N = 1
 (k). Following the same steps, we obtain N = 1
 (k).







From Lemma 1, note that we can write
Z 1
'r





h(';'r)g(')d' =  h'n
r: (A-5)






Proof of Proposition 2. For part 1, taking the natural logarithm of equation (20) we obtain























. Given that  > 0 and k   (E)k+1 > 0, it is the case
that 'D;E > 0.























which is always greater than zero.
43Proof of Proposition 3. In the main text I showed that 
X(') is less than one. For part 1,
we need to prove that
@
X(')































  1 and that 
0() > 0, we can verify that
@
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For part 2, we need to prove that
@
X(')



























































@E . Again, given that 





X < 0. Moreover, given that '








Proof of Proposition 4. For part 1, it is enough to prove that
@ lny
X(')













As in equation (26), we have



















































  1 <  1;
as 







X;E > 1. Note that y
X(') is more elastic the closer the
Foreign rm is to the cuto level, '
X, and it approaches  1 as ' ! 1.














which is given in equation (A-9) and is strictly less than zero. As ' ! 1, we have that

X(') ! 1, and 
X(') = 1
2+




Proof of Proposition 5. From the rst result in Proposition 1 we can write that ln  p
X =
ln#(k) + lnW   lnZ   ln'D. Therefore, the elasticity of  p
X with respect to E is just 
X =
@ ln  p
X
@ lnE =  
@ ln'D
@ lnE =  'D;E: Given that 'D;E > 0, it is always true that 
X < 0.
Proof of Proposition 6. For the value of exports, we need to prove that @ lnV E
@ lnE > k and
@ lnV E
@ lnE <  k. Given that V E = NX
N I and that N and I are constants, we get @ lnV E
@ lnE =
@ lnNX







From equation (25) we know that 'X;E <  1. Thus, it is enough to prove that @ lnNP
@ lnE  0.










From Proposition 1 we know that 'D;E > 0. Then, we also obtain 'D;E  'X;E > 1. Moreover,
NP must be non-negative so that ()k'k
D 'k
X  0. Therefore, @ lnNP
@ lnE > 0 so that @ lnV E
@ lnE > k.




@ lnE <  k.
For the quantity of exports, given that the value of exports (in terms of the importer's
currency) is the product of the aggregate import price and and the aggregate traded quantity,
we calculate the elasticity of the traded quantity as the dierence in exchange rate elasticities
between the value of exports and the aggregate import price. Let YX and Y 
X represent the
aggregate quantity of exports of Home and Foreign, respectively. Using the result in Proposition
(5), we then have @ lnYX





@ lnE = @ lnV E
@ lnE  ( 'D;E). For the quantity










As before, given that 'X;E <  1 and @ lnNP
@ lnE > 0, we get @ lnYX




@ lnE <  k.
Proof of Proposition 7. We obtain rst  ~ pD. From section 6.1 we know that ~ pD(') =
(1+D('))W
Z ' 1. Substituting D(') by the corresponding expression from equation (10) we
rewrite ~ pD(') as










which is homogeneous of degree    1 in (';'D). Then, using Lemma 1, we obtain that the
average unit price of Home goods available for purchase at Home is










xk +2dx is a constant depending on the parameters k and . In the same
way, the Home average price of imported goods is  ~ p
X = #(k;)EW
Z ' 1
X . The ratio of  ~ p
X


























D ,  ~ pX = #(k;)W
EZ ' 1








Proof of Proposition 8. Given that ~ 
X(') = 
X('),










X('), the proof is identical to the proofs of Propositions 3 and 4.
Proof of Proposition 9. For part 1, we obtain from Proposition 7 that ln  ~ p
X = (ln'
X  
ln'D)+ln  ~ pD. Therefore, the elasticity of  ~ p
X with respect to E, the pass-through rate, is given
by ~ 
X =
@ ln  ~ p
X





+ ~ D; where ~ D =
@ ln  ~ pD
@ lnE = (   1)'D;E. Given also that
'
X;E = 1 + 'D;E, we obtain ~ 
X =  + (   1)'D;E.
For part 2, let ~ YX and ~ Y 
X represent the aggregate (non-quality-adjusted) quantity of exports
of Home and Foreign, respectively. As in the proof of Proposition 6, we then have @ ln ~ YX
@ lnE =
@ lnV E
@ lnE  ~ X(') and
@ lnY 
X
@ lnE = @ lnV E
@ lnE  ~ 
X('). Following the same steps as in part 1 of this proof,
we get ~ X(') =   + (   1)'
D;E. Using equation (25), we obtain ~ X(') = (   1)'X;E   1.
Therefore, using the previous expression and equation (A-10) for the aggregate quantity of Home
exports, we have









Given that 'X;E <  1 and @ lnNP
@ lnE > 0, we get @ ln ~ YX
@ lnE > k + . Following the same steps, we
obtain
@ ln ~ Y 
X
@ lnE <  (k + ).
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